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1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with a sensitive and controversial topic – ob-
jectivity in ethnographic research. More specifically, I would like 
to look at how reflexive procedures can increase the objectivity of 
the knowledge produced by ethnographies. The essay is organized 
in five parts. I will start by giving a preliminary, summary defini-
tion of the two key concepts which are at the centre of my analy-
sis – objectivity and reflexivity1. I will then give a brief descrip-
tion of the epistemological framework in which my conceptions 
of objectivity and reflexivity are located. Thirdly, I move on to 
consider the epistemic status of ethnographic research, and will 
emphasize that ethnographies are not just “theory–laden”, as 
many writers have stated, but also “praxis” or “procedure laden”. 
In other words, I will stress that it is not only theories which are 
inevitably incorporated in research, influencing what observations 
can be made; much the same can also be said of the concrete re-
search practices which are supposed to embody the theoretical 
perspective. Fourthly, I will discuss why it is so useful to employ 
reflexive practices, and then immediately afterwards will illus-
trate the ways in which reflexive descriptions can contribute to 
greater objectivity of ethnographic accounts. In conclusion, I will 
discuss a number of objections which have been raised against re-
flexivity. 
 
 
2. Objectivity and reflexivity: a preliminary definition 
 
The notion of objectivity has been interpreted in various ways, 
most commonly (and perhaps most obviously) in realist terms, 
adopting – usually in a tacit way – the correspondence theory of 
truth. In this view, an account is objective if it offers a true represen-
tation of the object it refers to. The notion of objectivity I employ in 
                                                 
1 A first version of this paper was presented at the 6th ESA Conference, Murcia, 
Spain, 23-26 September 2003. Research network 16: Qualitative Methods session 3 – 
Ethnography and video analysis. 
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my analysis is quite different, in that I assume a concept of “truth” 
based on inter–subjective agreement, constructed discursively within 
a forum set up by the scientific community, or rather a specific frac-
tion of the latter. What gives an assertion (or set of assertions) objec-
tivity is not the use of a “right” method (right both in data collection 
and analysis), nor the “tribunal of experience”, which can decide 
whether the social world and its representation correspond. Instead, 
objectivity is conferred by a collective subject – a forum which ar-
rives at a decision, using the tools of argumentation rather than those 
of demonstration (Perleman and Olbrechts–Tyteca, 1958). This ties 
down the notion of objectivity to specific coordinates of space and 
time, and makes the attribution of objectivity status always revoca-
ble2. 
I understand the notion of reflexivity defined by Altheide and 
Johnson (1994) as an account of the way research was carried out 
and of the characteristics of the observer. I am therefore discuss-
ing reflexivity in a very specific sense – one which is quite dif-
ferent from the way the term is used by Woolgar (1988: 21–4) 
and by ethnomethodologists (i.e., constitutive reflexivity), and 
also from the way the practice is employed by post–modernists, 
which Salzman (2002) dubs “reporting in print researcher’s feel-
ings”. 
 
 
3. Epistemological framework 
 
The definitions of objectivity and reflexivity I have outlined al-
ready give an idea of the epistemological line I take. However, I will 
elaborate the latter a little. My stance derives from two main sources 
of inspiration that Derek Phillips profitably sets together in his semi-
nal text, Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge (1977): the later Witt-
genstein, and the theory of non demonstrative discourse developed by 
Perleman and Olbrechts–Tyteca (1958). 
                                                 
2 There is a similarity here with Quine’s notion of science as a continual re-
weaving of a network of beliefs. 
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With their weighty Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle 
rhétorique, Chaïm Perleman and Lucie Olbrechts–Tyteca draw at-
tention to (and to a certain extent rehabilitate) a form of reasoning 
that, at first glance, would seem to have little or nothing to do with 
scientific thinking. This is “persuasive reasoning”, which, from the 
first pages of their discussion, Perleman and Olbrechts–Tyteca con-
trast with the “demonstrative reasoning” typical of the formal dis-
ciplines and, by extension, of the natural sciences3. The Traité 
marks the beginning – over and above the designs and expectations 
of its authors (see Pera 1991: X) – of scientific discourse’s migra-
tion away from the domain of demonstration towards that of argu-
mentation, where the Tarskian notion of truth as correspondence 
gives way to the notion of truth as inter–subjective agreement, an 
agreement constructed discursively within a specific audience, 
made up of the (pertinent section) of the scientific community. In 
such settings, which can include, for instance, the board of a socio-
logical review or a publisher’s scientific committee, net of the dis-
tortions that peer review can only partially curb (I am thinking in 
particular of the reputation and power of authors and reviewers), 
whether the audience is persuaded hinges on the force of the argu-
ments with which the author defends the “good reasons” supporting 
the asseribility of his claims. The core of these arguments can be 
effectively depicted by drawing on the conceptual categories pro-
posed by Stephen Toulmin. Toulmin (1958) distinguishes between 
six types of statement, identified on the basis of the function they 
fulfill vis–à–vis the audience. Alongside the Claim (C), whose as-
seribility is being defended, we thus have Data (D) that present the 
grounds supporting the conclusions; the Warrant (W) which dem-
onstrates the guarantees that authorize our movement from the data 
to the conclusions; the Backing (B) that supports, empirically for 
the most part, the warrant; a Qualifier (Q) which indicates the 
strength of the empirical support; and a Rebuttal (R) which indi-
                                                 
3 Some years later, Jerome Bruner was to return to this approach to shaping the 
things of the world, distinguishing between narrative thinking and the reasoning more 
geometrico of the natural sciences as two distinct modes of “cognitive functioning” 
(Bruner 1986). 
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cates the counter–arguments that challenge the conclusions4. Toul-
min’s model is concisely illustrated in Figure 1 below5. 
                                                 
4 In the social sciences, and in ethnography in particular, the persuasiveness of an 
argument also stems from other, as it were, warmer, aspects, such as the esthetic qual-
ity of the writing, or the author’s ability to inspire emotions in the reader that ap-
proximate the experience of “being there”. Opinions regarding the legitimacy of these 
persuasive devices differ, ranging from a stern rejection of the language of the emo-
tions, to its enthusiastic celebration (see Denzin and Giardina 2008: Introduction). 
The radicalism of both these positions can be refuted with reasons that are more solid 
than those expressed by the adage, “in medio stat virtus”. The efficacy of combining 
the two communicative registers – the analytic and the esthetic-emotional – is sus-
tained by Gregory Bateson, who coined the term “double description” for this style of 
expression (1979). The two expressive registers, notes Bateson, are complementary, 
and combining them provides a more accurate portrayal of the object of study, thus 
offering – I might add – more elements whereby the audience can decide whether it is 
appropriate. I thank Sergio Manghi for drawing my attention to this important aspect 
of Bateson’s work. 
5 To illustrate Toulmin’s model of argument, I will take an example from a recent 
study of mine (Cardano, in press). The study addresses the experience of psychic suf-
fering, as exemplified by four "flesh and blood" ideal types. For our purposes, atten-
tion here will focus on comparing two cases, Marta and Serena, who faced with the 
same experience – verbal auditory hallucinations, or hearing voices – adopt radically 
different coping strategies. Whereas Marta interprets her experience as the outcome of 
a demonic possession, Serena sees her voices as a gift; where Marta tries to silence 
the voices, Serena decides to listen to what they say. One of the conclusions I reach 
from comparing their illness narratives fits Toulmin’s model. CLAIM. The conse-
quences of an undoubtedly disturbing event, such as hearing voices, are from many 
points of view socially-constructed, dependent on the characteristics of the context in 
which they take shape. The experience of hearing voices may cause people to hesitate, 
uncertain as to whether they are beginning a “psychiatric career” (with the stigmatis-
ing label of schizophrenia), or commencing a new life in which this experience can be 
seen as a charisma, a divine gift, which opens the way to a new and higher sensitivity. 
QUALIFIER. The expression “may hesitate” alludes to a tendential relationship 
(which does not always exists and/or may not exist for all subjects) between the char-
acteristics of the context and the impact that the experience of hearing voices has in 
the life course. DATA. Large quotations from the illness narratives of Marta and 
Serena. WARRANT. Methodological guarantees regarding the legitimacy of drawing 
conclusions about events in life starting from their narrative reconstruction, acquired 
during an in-depth interview. BACKING. Empirical documentation which makes it 
possible to assess the match between “life history”, or in other words the complete re-
construction of an individual’s biography from all available documents, and “life 
story”, i.e., an autobiographical account (see Denzin 1989). REBUTTAL. The claim 
will not stand if the chain of biographical events following the verbal auditory hallu-
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Figure 1. Toulmin’s model of the procedural form of argumentation 
 
           D 
 
    Since W 
 
 
On account of B 
So Q, C 
 
 
Unless R 
Key 
D: Data; W: Warrant; B: Backing; Q: Qualifier;  
C: Claim; R: Rebuttal. 
 
 
What Toulmin’s model effectively breaks down into a set of argu-
mentative functions corresponds to the “dialogue” between empirical 
documentation and theory that Howard Becker puts at the centre of 
analysis of social phenomena (see Becker 1998: 66). It is the quality 
of this dialogue, the solidity of theoretical and methodological “war-
rants” that authorizes the passage from data to conclusions, which can 
persuade the audience of the asseribility of claims maintained by the 
author/observer. 
When the “game of science” is set in this frame, the role of the 
players and their decisions must be redefined. In the neopositivist 
view (and also beyond its confines, as far as Popper), the “game of 
science” involves two players and a referee. The researcher and the 
outside world (the cultures, social organizations, institutions and much 
more) take the role of players. The referee’s role falls to the scientific 
community, which is called upon to guarantee methodological ortho-
doxy and to read, so to speak, the verdict of the “tribunal of experi-
ence” which establishes the truth value of each assertion, which pro-
claims or denies its correspondence with the things of the world and 
hence its truth (cf. Pera 1991: Chapter 5). In the new argumentative 
frame (with clear conventionalist antecedents), the game involves 
three players: the researcher, the outside world, and the scientific 
                                                                                                         
cinations – as it emerges from the narrations in question – shows differences in the 
two cases examined that are entirely independent of the context. 
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community. The researcher’s task is to answer a question about this 
world, while the latter, or rather, the people who live in it, can choose 
to establish how much cooperation will be afforded to the scientific 
undertaking6. Persuaded of the accuracy of his answer to the query 
that sent him into the field, the researcher must then persuade the third 
player, the scientific community who – in this case – will hand down a 
less peremptory verdict, offspring of the procedure that generated the 
persuasive reasoning. 
 
This kind of stance is similar to that taken up by Wittgenstein on 
the subjects of truth, doubt and uncertainty, for Wittgenstein also 
seems to see these as tied to agreement. 
 
(…) human agreement decides what is true and what is false. 
(Wittgenstein 1953, sec. 241) 
 
The potentially relativistic implications of this position are miti-
gated by comments in On Certainty, where Wittgenstein links his 
conventionalist notion of truth to the social and material context 
within which agreement takes shape (Wittgenstein talks here of “facts 
of nature”)7. The game of science, like any other language game, rests 
on conventions; but these are limited by the way in which people and 
their world are constituted (Phillips 1977). In other words, the state-
ments built in the game of science rest on a set of propositions which 
Wittgenstein sees as “established” (they “stand fast” for us), or deter-
mined by the characteristics of the “form of life” in question. A couple 
of examples make this position clearer. 
 
                                                 
6 Here, I espouse the thesis of Raymond Boudon, for whom “Contrary to a widely 
held idea, the aim of science is not to explain the real  which, as such, is unknow-
able, or at least can be know only through metaphysical methods  but to answer 
questions about the real” (Boudon 1984). Concerning the cooperation between “us” 
and “them”, it should be noted that, in the case of ethnographic work, the question is 
crucial not only on the epistemological plane, but also ethically and politically – 
though these are aspects I will not deal with here. 
7 See, for example, Wittgenstein’s comments on the conventional character of 
units of measurement in Philosophical Investigations, sec. 142. 
 7 
I, L.W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn’t sawdust in his body or in his 
head, even though I have no direct evidence of my sense to the contrary. (On Cer-
tainty sec. 281). 
I believe that I have forebears, and that every human being has them. I believe 
that there are various cities, and, quite generally, in the main facts of geography 
and history. I believe that the earth is a body on whose surface we move and that 
it no more suddenly disappears or the like than any other solid body: this table, 
this house, this tree, etc. If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before 
my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me. (On Cer-
tainty sec. 234). 
 
These propositions are “established” not by the force of reason 
(still less by virtue of their correspondence to reality), but because 
they are deliberately removed from critical analysis, being “there – 
like our life” (On Certainty, 1969, sec. 559)8. In particular, Wittgen-
stein observes that it is only by virtue of some established assertions, 
taken as certain, that doubt is possible. “Doubt itself rests on what is 
beyond doubt” (sec. 519). What is seen as established varies from one 
time and place to another; but some taken–for–granted notions are al-
ways necessary as a background in order to distinguish “true” from 
“false”. 
 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correct-
ness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inher-
ited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (On Certainty 
esc. 94). 
 
 
4. Ethnograhic research as theory–laden and procedure–laden 
 
By now it has become well “established” that any ethnography is 
necessarily the representation of a culture from a particular point of 
view. As Hilary Putnam points out, it is not possible to think of de-
scribing the world with “God’s eye view” (Putnam 1981)9. The most 
common argument for seeing knowledge as inevitably perspectival is 
that every act of observation is, as Hanson (1958) pointed out, “theory 
                                                 
8 There are important analogies here with Schütz’ discussion of common sense. 
9 Cf. also the comments Smith and Deemer (2000) make on the unavoidability of 
relativism. 
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laden”. I fully agree with this, but I would like to add a point (sec. 4.1 
below) and make a specification (4.2). 
 
 
4.1 On “procedure–ladenness” 
 
The content of an ethnography is not shaped solely by the theo-
ries which guide observation, but also by the concrete observational 
procedures employed to apply that theory in the field. This means 
that doing ethnography is not just “theory laden” but also “praxis” or 
“procedures laden”. In other words, the observational role taken up, 
the research techniques used, the implicit or explicit forms of sam-
pling adopted, and more in general the line taken up during ethnog-
raphy – all these, as well as theoretical preconceptions, go towards 
determining the representation of the culture being studied10. 
This means that we must open to inspection, not just the theory be-
ing used and the “pre–comprehension” (Gadamer 1960) which lies 
behind the way a culture is interpreted, but also an outline of the eth-
nographic experience which had an equal influence in shaping the 
ethnographic text. This is the purpose of a reflexive account which 
gives information about the methods used – methods in the etymo-
logical sense of “path by which” we arrived at a particular representa-
tion and construction of the object in question11. 
                                                 
10 I believe it is even more essential to give an account of the circumstances and 
methods of the research than a description of theoretical assumptions, for the latter 
can often be inferred from the body of the text – e.g., in the authors cited, in the “id-
iom” adopted (theoretical terms, model of exposition, etc.) 
11 From this standpoint, the reflexive account performs a function similar to that 
fulfilled in other contexts by the operational definition. In this case, it is an emerging 
operational definition, which takes shape, not before the documentation is built up, 
but only when this stage of the research process has ended; something that tells – after 
the fact – how we “measured” what we encountered in the field. 
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4.2 There are theories and theories 
 
A couple of distinctions are in order regarding the theory–laden na-
ture of observation. The various theories which, like “coloured specta-
cles” (Mills 1963), shape the way we experience and represent the cul-
ture being studied differ amongst themselves. They differ in terms of 
their origins (scientific or common sense language12) and in terms of 
the forum which assesses their plausibility (a section of the scientific 
community or the totality of reasonable individuals). For example, an 
ethnographer studying South Africa might make use of Parkin’s the-
ory of social closure (1979), but also a much more widely–shared 
common sense theory which allowed him to distinguish between 
Whites and Blacks. Thus, ethnographers studying apartheid are able to 
orient themselves in the various neighbourhoods of Johannesburg and 
recognize processes of “community closure”, “exclusion”, “usurpa-
tion” or “double closure” (Parkin op. cit.) due to a series of established 
propositions enabling them to identify Whites and Blacks as such. 
This distinction between kinds of theories has evident implica-
tions for assessing the extent of relativism (a theme I can only refer 
to briefly). The fact that representation of a culture is based not 
only on propositions which are theoretical in the explicit sense 
(i.e., in the strict sense which Maxwell 1992: 291–3 gives the 
term), but also on widely–shared knowledge – what I term estab-
lished knowledge – means that we can draw on the latter to sepa-
rate the terrain between the (various) plausible interpretations and 
those which are implausible. For interpretations which conflict 
with notions which are established, with images of the world which 
the totality of rational individuals adheres to, will be implausible. 
These propositions make it possible (to use a recent incident taken 
from the Italian news) to decide whether the experience of oppo-
nents of the Fascist regime in Italy was that of a “holiday resort” or 
of “political confinement”. In other words, the construction of the 
interpretative edifice intended to describe a culture rests on a set of 
                                                 
12 On the contribution which implicit or common sense theories make towards the 
representation of a culture, see Maxwell’s comments on the idea of “descriptive valid-
ity” (Maxwell 1992: 287). 
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established propositions. Numerous edifices can be constructed on 
those foundations, but no edifice can remain without resting on 
them13. 
 
 
5. Reflexive accounts for what? 
 
What I have called “procedures ladenness” constitutes, in my 
opinion, the most convincing argument for including in all ethno-
graphies a careful reflexive description, which as Altheide and 
Johnson (1994) say, helps the reader and the wider “audience” to 
understand: i) where the author is coming from; ii) what form of 
observation relationship enabled the ethnographer to distill a repre-
sentation of the culture being studied (or an answer to the question 
from which the study moved)14; and iii) what is the specific, case 
by case, link between the various statements an ethnographic ac-
count is made up of and the observational experience which in-
spired them. 
A reflexive description is one (not the only, and perhaps not the 
most important) thing to which the scientific community can refer 
when deciding which aspects of the ethnographer’s representation to 
“adopt” (Goodman and Elgin 1988) and which to reject. In other 
words, the reflexive account allows readers to conduct a kind of 
“thought experiment” whereby the research itinerary followed by the 
ethnographer is followed through in imagination, so that the reader as-
                                                 
13 In a recent article, Hammersley (1999: 577) recalls the metaphor used by Otto 
Neurath, which “compares the task of scientists to that of sailors on the open sea who 
must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start from base”. In order to be able to 
repair or partially re-build their ship on the open sea, sailors need to be able to rest on 
a set of planks which they know will float. Established propositions have a similar 
function to these planks: the work of constructing an interpretative edifice rests on 
these planks. 
14 On the legitimacy of an ethnography oriented, not towards the holistic recon-
struction of a culture’s profile, but, more humbly, towards answering certain questions 
about it, see Hammersley (2008: 50; 135). 
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sesses the ability of the empirical procedures employed to produce the 
findings the ethnographer claims15. 
On a more strictly methodological plane, we might say that the 
contribution of a reflexive account to the construction of objectivity 
can be identified in three areas, which I outline in the following three 
sub–sections. 
 
 
5.1 Reflexive accounts as instruments for reporting uncertainty 
 
An important contribution which reflexive accounts make is to 
give readers the tools for establishing the degree of certainty (see 
King, Kehoanne and Verba 1994: 31–33) which can be attributed – in 
accordance with the characteristics of the observational relationship – 
to the various statements making up an ethnographic account (or at 
least certain key statements)16. Reflexive accounts enable readers to 
assess the plausibility of each statement (or at least of the most salient 
one) by scrutinizing the empirical condition which led to their formu-
lation. 
The distinctive features of ethnographic work, its deep–seated de-
pendence on the context, make it impossible to identify general rules 
that can link the conditions under which empirical documentation is 
produced to the plausibility of the statements that are, as it were, dis-
tilled from it each time. It is hard to maintain, without uncertainty, that 
the statements extracted from “naturally–occurring data” are usually 
more plausible to those about the same phenomenon but which have 
been elicited by the researcher’s action17. The lack of general rules 
makes it necessary to scrutinize – case by case – the conditions for 
                                                 
15 If – by definition – the criterion of “public reproducibility” cannot be met for 
ethnographic research, a reflexive account can give readers all the elements they need 
to go through the experience at least mentally. 
16 This is equivalent to the function performed by the Qualifier in Toulmin’s 
model (1958). 
17 Another position is taken by van Maanen (1979), who establishes a hierarchical 
relationship between the two contexts for producing empirical data that leads him to 
count chiefly on naturally occurring data (“operative data” in the author’s terminol-
ogy) in producing plausible statements. 
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producing empirical documentation, shedding light on their limits (or 
at least those that can be intercepted), and identifying the set of ques-
tions for which the collected material can furnish an authoritative an-
swer18. An example may make the idea clearer. If in a description of 
an esoteric community the ethnographer says that he did not take part 
in the rites which took place in the secret temple, but obtained a vague 
and reticent description from a number of members of the sect, his in-
formation of that aspect of the culture will be considered less plausible 
than parts of his description based on practices in which he himself 
participated numerous times19. 
This function of the reflexive account might be compared with the 
kind of statistics which indicate a margin of error for an estimate: sig-
nificance level and interval of confidence. 
At the basis of this idea is the conviction that material collected in 
an ethnographic account should not be considered an indivisible 
whole – as though it was plausible or implausible in its totality. Even 
for a text which constructs its own interpretation of a culture using 
one, and just one, image or metaphor it is still possible – drawing on a 
reflexive account – to establish which aspects of the culture fit the im-
age best and which least. 
 
 
5.2 Reflexive accounts as a methodological criterion? 
 
A question which is worth considering is the methodological status 
of reflexivity (in the sense intended in this paper). Can reflexivity be 
considered a criterion for establishing the objectivity of an ethno-
graphic account? I do not feel able to give just one reply to this ques-
tion, for the answer depends on what we mean by criterion. 
Reflexivity is not a methodological criterion in the sense that it 
does not “indicate criteria of success established beforehand” (Rorty 
                                                 
18 This corresponds to what Jerzy Topolski, historiographer, defines as a docu-
ment’s area of authenticity, viz., the “sum total of those questions (problems) which a 
given source is capable of answering truthfully” (Topolski 1973). 
19 I am thinking of my own study of the making sacred of nature, based on ethno-
graphic study of two communities (Cardano 1997). 
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1991). It cannot be thought of as an algorithm – something we can fol-
low and be guaranteed of ending up in the safe haven of objectivity. 
Nor can it be considered a methodological criterion in the sense of a 
set of operative instructions of the kind furnished by, say, grounded 
theory (at least as the latter was originally intended). Rather, exhorta-
tions to reflexivity concern what needs to be done in addition to and 
in parallel with fieldwork.  
Reflexivity can, however, be considered a methodological criterion 
in the sense that a reflexive account gives the scientific community 
important (though not conclusive) tools for assessing the plausibility 
of (some or all of) the assertions made in the ethnography. 
Lastly, I believe it can be said that a reflexive account gives the 
academic community “criteria”, in the strict sense suggested in texts 
of qualitative methodology – credibility, reliability and plausibility 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Guba and Lincoln 1982; Hammersley 1992) 
To evaluate the quality of an ethnographic work. A detailed reflexive 
account offers the community of ethnographers all the elements it 
needs to decide about the credibility, reliability and plausibility (see 
above) of the contribution. As an aside, I might add that I believe that 
a detailed reflexive account also provides the elements necessary for 
assessing an ethnography in terms of more conventional notions of va-
lidity and reliability (cf. Kirk and Miller 1986). As I have argued in a 
previous work (Cardano 2001), this is true even when such notions are 
understood in a generally realist sense, as tends to be the case among 
quantitative researchers. 
One final point is worth making. If reflexivity can be considered a 
criterion, rather than being a scientific or scientist criterion, it ought 
perhaps to be seen as a criterion of common sense, something along 
the following lines: “If you want me to believe what you tell me you 
saw, explain to me how you came to see it”20. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The difficulty of living with any scientific criterion is convincingly argued by 
Schwandt (1996).  
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5.3 Reflexive accounts: creativity versus standardization 
 
I will end my remarks on the methodological peculiarities of re-
flexive procedures with a brief comment on creativity, as opposed to 
standardization. The exhortation to include a reflexive account as part 
of an ethnography should not be seen in terms of a strict methodologi-
cal canon which must be followed to the letter. Presenting things in 
this way would inevitably lead to conformism or worse still, to a sort 
of methodological surveillance (see Paechter 1996). Reflexive prac-
tices can be adopted by researchers of all methodological faiths, 
whether they are adepts of grounded theory or try to follow precepts 
of narratological analysis. Since they have no ties to any specific 
methodological approach, reflexive practices do not inhibit, but actu-
ally encourage methodological creativity. And no less important, these 
creative exercises can become a shared heritage that is useful for both 
research and didactic purposes. 
 
 
6. What’s wrong with reflexivity? 
 
I conclude by examining the main objections made with regard to 
reflexive procedures as a means for constructing objectivity. Three 
seem to me particularly pertinent: i) the self–contradictory nature of 
reflexive pretensions; ii) the danger of untruthfulness; iii) the imper-
fections of the forum supposed to decide on objectivity, and more in 
general on the plausibility of a contribution to knowledge. 
 
 
6.1 Epistemic bootstrapping: the paradox of reflexive accounts 
 
The first and perhaps most stinging objection concerns the epis-
temic status of reflexive accounts, and particularly their claim to pro-
viding ethnography objectivity. Critics who raise this objection21 argue 
that reflexive accounts are needed because it is believed that the eth-
nographer’s description of a culture is necessarily tied to a specific 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Marco Marzano for forcing me to face this problem. 
 15 
point of view which the reflexive account ought to enable the reader to 
recognize. However (so the criticism goes), what reason do we have 
for believing that the description of the work of ethnographic descrip-
tion is immune from the distortions produced by a specific point of 
view? What special powers enable reflexive ethnographers to lift 
themselves off the ground and regard their own work from on high, 
simply by pulling on their own bootstraps, in the manner of Baron 
Munchausen? 
My reply to this objection draws on the distinctions I developed in 
my epistemological digression in section 3 (thus hopefully justifying 
the fact that I forced readers to plough through a tangle of quotations). 
In particular, the distinction between established propositions and 
propositions open to doubt is relevant here. The reasons which lead 
me to have confidence in the ability of a reflexive account to promote 
the objectivity of an ethnography have to do with the different combi-
nation of these two types of propositions in the text describing the cul-
ture studied, as opposed to the text describing the procedures followed 
by the research. An effective reflexive account is made up, in my 
view, of a suitable number of descriptions based on widely shared 
“theories”, deriving from assumptions which have the character of es-
tablished propositions. I am thinking, in particular, of the description 
of the duration of the fieldwork, which will be cast in terms of a num-
ber of days, weeks, years. No–one doubts the meaning of these terms 
(the question of mendacity will be considered below). Descriptions of 
the observational relationship in terms of whether the ethnographer 
was inside, outside, or in the vicinity of, the tribe studied have a simi-
lar epistemic status. I am thinking here, for example, of the description 
Humphreys gives of his observational role in Tearoom Trade (1975). 
To sum up: the reflexive account ensures a basis for assessing objec-
tivity through its “descriptive protocols”. Among these are those “col-
oured spectacles” (Mills, op. cit.) which all reasonable people have on 
their noses: descriptions which have been worked out on the basis of 
criteria of relevance (Sen 1982) implicitly chosen by all. It is these 
which constitute a large share of the ingredients in a reflexive account. 
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6.2 Mendacity 
 
Salzman (2002) stresses the problem of untruthfulness, asking 
“what ensures that the writer of the account is not telling fibs, not 
spinning an account which intentionally confers plausibility to their 
representation of the culture being studied?” The question seems to 
me an important one; I will try to reply on two levels. 
On the basis of what I have argued above regarding the ingredients 
a good reflexive account ought to contain, we might reply that the 
mendacious ethnographer can be unmasked. For many of the asser-
tions made in an ethnographic account are, in principle, open to public 
inspection. “You say you were in the Raelian sect for two years – ok, 
let’s go and see what the Raelians say”; “You say you made more than 
a hundred interviews – show us the tapes and the transcriptions”… 
My second reply is that the problem of mendacity does not just re-
gard reflexive practices and it thus seems illegitimate to cite this as an 
objection to the latter. Researchers can cheat when they are describing 
their ethnographic experience in the same way as they can cheat (as 
the history of science indeed shows) with laboratory experiments, with 
survey research, and so on. The problem of ethics is not just a problem 
for reflexive ethnographers; if it is a real problem – as indeed it is – it 
must be taken seriously by the whole scientific community. And on 
many occasions the scientific community has shown itself capable of 
defending itself. 
 
 
6.3 The problem of the forum being laden with social, academic 
and media power 
 
The third objection goes to the heart of the process of constructing 
objectivity since it questions the deliberative virtue of the scientific 
community and (in some versions of the critique) maintains that the 
very idea of a forum in which all participants calmly discuss the claim 
of this or that ethnographic account to objectivity is unrealistic (cf. 
Smith and Demeer 2000: 892). In particular, it is argued (this is the 
position taken up by Smith 1985: 6) that it is impossible to come to a 
non–constrained agreement, to use Rorty’s term, leaving aside the so-
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cial, academic and media power of the decision makers and of the re-
searcher whose contribution is being assessed. These are legitimate 
objections – so legitimate that the scientific community has set up or-
ganizational measures, such as those which are supposed to ensure 
anonymous review. We all know only too well that these kinds of 
measures are insufficient. However, recognizing that there is much 
room for improvement is not the same as denying their effectiveness. 
The situation is well expressed by Geertz in comments he makes on 
the key theme of my paper – objectivity: 
 
I have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is 
impossible in these matters (as, of course, it is), one might as well let one’s senti-
ments run loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a per-
fectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a 
sewer. (Geertz, 1973: 30). 
 
In the same way, the fact that an absolutely impartial forum is not 
possible does not mean that we may just as well leave decisions to the 
tribunal of the Holy Inquisition or to some hypothetical Confraternity 
of Cheats.  
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